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Improving security for remote payments
by Nour Abdul-Razzak, associate economist, Katy Jacob, business economist, and Richard D. Porter, vice president and senior policy advisor
Given the growing popularity of e-commerce and m-commerce over the past few years, 
remote payments have become commonplace. Unfortunately, remote payments fraud 
has grown in response. On September 26, 2011, the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago 
and the Secure Remote Payment Council (SRPc) co-hosted a symposium to discuss 
strategies that help reduce such forms of fraud.
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Remote payments, or transactions made 
in non-face-to-face environments, com-
prise many types of activities, including 
online shopping, peer-to-peer transac-
tions, and music or ringtone purchases 
made on mobile devices. For the vast 
majority of remote payments, there are 
many parties involved: the consumer, 
merchant, issuer, acquirer, switch, pos-
sibly a telecommunications company, 
and multiple third parties.1 Currently, 
no central body in either the public or 
private sector coordinates these parties 
in the U.S. payment system. The Federal 
Reserve serves as the statutory overseer 
of certain retail payment regulations, 
especially regarding checks, and the newly 
formed Consumer Financial Protection 
Bureau has some jurisdiction over con-
sumer protection issues related to pay-
ments. However, no single entity has 
broad jurisdiction over U.S. retail pay-
ments. This decentralized structure is 
critical to understanding why it is so 
challenging to come up with workable 
solutions to payments fraud (whether 
committed online or offline) in the U.S. 
The large number of parties involved in 
the U.S. payment system and the current 
lack of coordination by a central authority 
can make it difficult to pinpoint specific 
market failures that lead to payments 
fraud. Most fraud is inherently difficult to 
detect and probably even more difficult 
to measure, given the complexity of most 
payment systems. So, coming up with 
solid statistics on the magnitude of pay-
ments fraud is difficult. Nonetheless, 
most industry leaders agree that fraud 
costs are considerable. According to the 
Norton Cybercrime Report 2011 produced 
by the Symantec Corporation, there were 
431 million adult victims of cybercrime 
across the world over the past year, with 
losses (financial losses plus lost time) 
totaling $388 billion; the 2011 cybercrime 
ledger was $100 billion larger than the 
global black market for marijuana,  
cocaine, and heroin combined.2 In  
addition, according to Verizon’s 2011 
Data Breach Investigations Report, more 
than 1,200 cybercrime suspects were 
arrested by the U.S. Secret Service in 
2010; their crimes had resulted in over 
$500 million in actual fraud losses, 
and their activities had the potential 
for $7 billion in further losses.3 The 
Federal Bureau of Investigation is cur-
rently investigating more than 400 cases 
of corporate account takeovers4 involving 
unauthorized wire and ACH (automated 
clearinghouse) transfers amounting to 
$85 million in losses.5 Indeed, as orga-
nized crime around the world increasingly 
turns to remote payment channels to 
fund illicit, and even terrorist, activities, 
the ability to effectively combat payments 
fraud takes on greater importance.6 Various means are currently being used to manage payments 
fraud, and each has its own benefits and risks.
Complex contributing factors
Advanced technology has enabled new 
forms of commerce to flourish, but it has 
also opened up new channels for fraud. 
Remote payments fraud can occur in a 
variety of ways at a multitude of points 
in any given transaction. Vulnerabilities 
abound in many types of remote pay-
ments—and oftentimes such weaknesses 
are not isolated to specific transactions. 
Take, for instance, Internet transactions, 
which are typically secured by SSL (Secure 
Sockets Layer) encryption.7 Cybercrim-
inals can break the SSL encryption and 
decrypt data passing between a web 
server and an end-user’s browser. SSL 
protocols can also be circumvented by 
tricking consumers into using fraudu-
lent websites and revealing their per-
sonal information, i.e., by “phishing.” 
In addition, mobile payments can be 
vulnerable to fraud if the hardware it-
self and the attending software are not 
properly secured—criminals can inter-
cept wireless communications to access 
transaction information. 
Besides security vulnerabilities, we must 
consider other complicated and inter-
related factors when examining remote 
payments fraud. For example, card issuers 
are generally less concerned about fraud 
risk for remote payments because they 
are often immune to losses in such cases.8 
Merchants are most often liable for losses 
due to remote payments fraud, especially 
since zero liability programs instituted 
by the card network companies often 
protect consumers. Partly in response 
to this liability issue, more and more 
online and mobile payments are now 
being made via alternative payment 
channels, including PayPal and other 
closed-loop, proprietary systems, which 
are not interoperable. These various new 
payment platforms may constitute a grow-
ing security risk because of the increased 
number of entry points for fraudsters. 
Even so, if remote payments fraud in-
volving payment cards is not managed 
properly, consumers might increasingly 
move to alternative payment methods 
that work well in niche environments but 
are not ubiquitous. And if more con-
sumers use these alternative platforms, 
overall market inefficiencies might arise 
because these platforms tend to be closed. 
Open platforms, wherein any payor and 
any payee can transact with each other, 
are critical to achieving overall efficiencies 
in a payment system as complex as that 
of the U.S.
Payments fraud management today
Various means are currently being used 
to manage payments fraud, and each has 
its own benefits and risks. For example, 
most merchants comply with the PCI DSS 
(Payment Card Industry Data Security 
Standard), which defines guidelines for 
merchants’ handling and processing of 
payment card data.9 However, compliance 
with PCI DSS does not guarantee total 
payments security; infamous data breaches 
have occurred when companies were 
nominally compliant with this industry 
standard.10 Some industry players con-
tend that because the major card network 
companies, such as Visa and MasterCard, 
determine how the standard is structured, 
it exists to protect the card network com-
panies above and beyond other parties 
in the system. That said, it is arguable 
that while PCI DSS has its problems, 
there is currently no better alternative 
to take its place. 
Encryption, which we touched on earlier, 
is also a vital means of mitigating pay-
ments fraud. Encryption converts card-
holder data into an unintelligible form 
except to those with the relevant crypto-
graphic key. Consumer- and transaction-
level data can be encrypted at a variety 
of points; some in the industry are push-
ing for total encryption from the moment 
a transaction is initiated until it is final-
ized. While encryption is a valuable tool, 
there are no accepted standards for its 
use across the payment system. Another 
essential means of providing payments 
security is authentication, which is critical 
in non-face-to-face transactions. Firms 
use authentication to determine that the 
person making a transaction is who she 
says she is. For example, one can connect 
what an individual knows, such as a pass-
word or personal identification number 
(PIN), to something only an individual 
has, such as a payment card. Other forms 
of authentication include device iden-
tification and advanced analytics—which 
combines user identity, device identity, 
typical consumer behavior, and charac-
teristic consumer–merchant interactions 
to identify fraudulent transactions. Of 
course, legitimate transactors can make 
illegitimate transactions, so authentica-
tion also has its limits. 
Some industry leaders have argued that 
using dynamic authentication, i.e., secu-
rity information that changes with each 
transaction, could provide even better 
protection than what is currently being 
used in the U.S. For instance, chip-based 
EMV (EuroPay, MasterCard, Visa) tech-
nology11 provides dynamic authentication 
and has become the preferred payment 
technology outside the U.S.12 Although 
adoption of this approach would improve 
security within the U.S. payment system, 
EMV is still susceptible to fraud. For 
example, PINs might be stolen or EMV 
terminals may be infected with malicious 
software, allowing transaction and PIN 
data to be used by criminals. 
Finally, there are other security protocols 
that are not widely used in the U.S. today 
that might gain traction as the volume 
of remote payment transactions rises 
even further. Biometric security, which 
includes using fingerprint and retinal 
scans to authenticate consumers making 
transactions, can enhance protection 
against fraud. Voice and facial recogni-
tion and other similar technology are 
already commonly available on mobile 
devices; as they increase in popularity, 
we might see them being used for au-
thentication purposes. One drawback 
of biometric security protocols is that con-
sumers in the U.S. have been reluctant 
to use them because of privacy concerns. 
Who pays for fraud?
Despite a plethora of strategies for  
attempting to prevent and manage pay-
ments fraud, two fundamental questions 
remain: Who is responsible for securing 
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the fraud costs be allocated and managed? 
From a public policy perspective, it is not 
necessarily useful to focus on a narrow 
cost–benefit analysis when examining 
the overall effects of payments fraud. 
In fact, if cost is the main driver of fraud 
solutions, efforts to improve fraud pre-
vention and management could actually 
be seen as producing negative returns 
over the long term. Suppose, for instance, 
that sufficient investment is made so that 
fraudulent activity declines quickly. It 
might then be hard to justify continued 
large investments in such a system if 
fraud losses become and stay low.  
As we mentioned before, it is currently 
difficult to gauge the overall costs of 
payments fraud—i.e., the infrastructure 
costs of fraud prevention and manage-
ment; the actual losses to issuers, acquirers, 
and consumers; customer abandonment 
due to security concerns; and other in-
tangible costs. One of the chief reasons 
that costs related to fraud are difficult 
to assess is that industry players have been 
hesitant to compete on the basis of fraud 
security, and therefore, few companies 
have publicly revealed information on 
their costs related to such matters. Many 
argue that exposing the relative risk with-
in the industry has the potential to make 
the industry look insecure as a whole. 
Both merchants and banks may be par-
ticularly sensitive about the reputational 
risks associated with reporting fraud 
losses, and so they might see very little 
benefit to revealing to the public their 
tabulated costs due to data breaches 
and other fraud—especially given the 
intensely competitive landscapes for 
retailers and banks. 
We can see that while payment platforms 
are rapidly evolving around the world, 
structural legacy issues are constraining 
the industry in managing fraud. Although 
significant investments have been made 
in shoring up security protocols of older 
systems, the industry has been slow to 
move to new, more comprehensive ways 
of addressing fraud. Data security improve-
ments in payments have largely relied on 
using personal information to provide 
authentication. Unfortunately, personal 
information can be stolen and is also 
often used for marketing purposes, which 
can undermine relationships between 
consumers and financial institutions. To 
date, the industry has not made much 
progress in broadly implementing inno-
vative fraud reduction strategies, such 
as dynamic authentication or biometric 
security, partly because many firms do 
not want to invest in new technology that 
they do not think will make a significant 
difference in fraud reduction relative 
to their investment.  
Further, when it comes to preventing 
payments fraud, consumers have little 
“skin in the game.” Bundled account fees 
and zero liability policies mask the true 
costs of payments in general—and pay-
ments fraud in particular. If consumers 
fail to protect their PINs, for instance, 
such authentication measures lose their 
value. However, there was little consensus 
among symposium participants about 
how to incentivize consumers to behave 
more responsibly to minimize fraud. 
Some argue that it is unwise to focus on 
how much fraud is caused by consumer 
negligence or malfeasance. To quantify 
the costs due to such fraud, the industry 
would have to undertake the difficult 
task of gauging what portion of payments 
fraud was attributable to consumers 
rather than to security flaws in some 
other part of the complicated system. 
Unless specific incentives for good con-
sumer behavior are developed or unless 
zero liability policies are eliminated, the 
industry might not be able to motivate 
consumers to change their behavior. 
Governance and payments fraud
Clearly, there are no easy solutions to the 
complex problem of payments fraud. 
As stated before, there are a myriad of 
parties involved in any given retail pay-
ment transaction, and there is no central 
governing authority with broad jurisdic-
tion over retail payments. Thus, business 
protocols developed by private companies 
can push payments in certain directions 
without much regard for how such moves 
affect the overall safety and efficiency of 
the payment system. For example, the 
business models of Visa and MasterCard 
have historically encouraged signature-
based debit card transactions (over PIN-
based ones) because they resulted in 
higher interchange fees for issuing banks.13 
Eventually, such transactions flourished, 
bringing with them increased fees for 
the card companies but also increased 
rates of fraud, since PIN-based transac-
tions are generally more secure forms 
of payment.14
Because incentives related to cost and 
security are not perfectly aligned, public 
sector officials must carefully consider 
how new payments regulation will affect 
the payment system’s overall integrity and 
efficiency. Recent financial regulation 
reform prompted the Board of Governors 
of the Federal Reserve System to issue 
final rules about debit card interchange 
fees and routing.15 This regulation  
attempted to lower the fee burden of 
electronic payments for merchants; credit 
card interchange fees were not addressed, 
however. Interchange fees for debit card 
transactions are now capped at $0.21 per 
swipe plus 0.05% of the face value amount 
of the transaction (compared with the 
previous average of $0.56 for signature-
based debit and $0.23 for PIN-based 
debit transactions); banks may also now 
receive up to $0.01 extra per swipe if 
they comply with fraud prevention pro-
cedures. While the addition of incentives 
related to fraud prevention is positive, 
it is possible that the new pricing regime 
will alter incentives for merchants and 
banks to push certain types of debit 1 An issuer is a bank that issues payment cards 
(credit, debit, and prepaid cards) to con-
sumers; an acquirer is a bank that converts 
payment card receipts into bank deposits 
for merchants; and a switch is a gateway that 
routes payments communications between 
an issuer and acquirer.
2 See www.symantec.com/content/en/us/
home_homeoffice/html/cybercrimereport/.
3 See p. 6 of www.verizonbusiness.com/ 
resources/reports/rp_data-breach-  
investigations-report-2011_en_xg.pdf.
4 Corporate account takeover is a form of 
corporate identity theft in which a business’s 
online credentials are stolen by malicious 
software, enabling criminals to initiate 
fraudulent banking activity.
5 Ira Apfel, 2011, “ACH and wire fraud 
cost corporates $85 million, FBI says,” 
AFPonline.org, September 21, available at 
www.afponline.org/Article_Detail.aspx?id= 
24352. For more information on corporate 
payments fraud, see Association for Financial 
Professionals, 2011, “2011 AFP Payments 
Fraud and Control Survey: Report of survey 
results,” Bethesda, MD, March, available 
at www.afponline.org/paymentsfraud/.
6 See Stephen Castle, 2011, “Crime gangs in 
Europe are profiting from web,” New York 
Times, May 4, available at www.nytimes.com/ 
2011/05/05/world/europe/05iht-  
europol05.html; and Europol, 2011, “Major 
international network of payment card 
fraudsters dismantled,” press release, July 12, 
The Hague, Netherlands, available at https://   
www.europol.europa.eu/content/press/
major-international-network-payment-card-
fraudsters-dismantled-1001. Note that these 
examples concern all cybercrime and are 
not only focused on payments fraud.
7 SSL encryption relies on digital certificates, 
which are public keys issued by an authority 
entrusted with establishing organizations’ 
credentials (e.g., Symantec Corporation’s 
VeriSign). 
8 The merchant generally bears the direct cost 
of remote payments fraud. The exception is 
for card-not-present transactions made with 
authentication programs such as the Verified 
by Visa program and the MasterCard  
SecureCode program. See Duncan B. 
Douglass, 2009, “An examination of the 
fraud liability shift in consumer card-based 
payment systems,” Economic Perspectives, 
Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, Vol. 33, 




9 According to Visa, approximately 97% of 
its level 1 merchants, 96% of its level 2 
merchants, and 60% of its level 3 mer-
chants are compliant with PCI standards. 
See Evan Schuman, 2011, “Level 3 mer-
chants hit PCI compliance at 60 percent, 
Visa confirms numbers for the first time,” 
StorefrontBacktalk, August 3, available at 




payments. If consumers are steered to-
ward credit cards instead, other costs, 
such as those related to fraud losses, 
might rise, since credit card transactions 
are more vulnerable to fraud. 
Without a central authority looking at 
all aspects of payments, new payments 
regulation is as likely to correctly address 
issues in some areas as it is to exacerbate 
problems in others. That said, some par-
ticipants at the symposium argued that 
regulation may actually lead to innova-
tion because some companies would be 
forced to come up with strategies to 
address the new rules that affect their 
business models. 
A call for more standards
Participants at the symposium mostly 
agreed that more payments security stan-
dards would be helpful to combat remote 
payments fraud. It may well be construc-
tive for industry players, with input from 
a public sector authority, to reach a con-
sensus on a core set of standards to 
combat remote payments fraud. A central-
ized public sector organization might be 
able to effectively play an objective role 
in encouraging more robust antifraud 
measures without necessarily advantaging 
or disadvantaging certain participants. 
Moreover, such an organization could 
coordinate with other public sector players 
(such as bank regulators and law enforce-
ment agencies) to collectively come up 
with effective solutions to cybersecurity 
problems. Some issues that might be 
addressed through payments security 
standards are:
•	 The level, nature, and number of 
authentication techniques employed;
•	 Best practices for encryption;
•	 Support from underlying device makers 
(e.g., hardware manufacturers) to im-
prove the bases on which the secure 
networks can be built;
•	 Privacy issues, so that data used to 
combat fraud are not in turn used 
for marketing purposes;
•	 Appropriate time frames for addressing 
fraud when it occurs, and support of 
real-time fraud detection;
•	 Information-sharing on suspected 
fraud schemes;
•	 Exploration of the use of biometric 
security measures; and
•	 Best practices for increasing the interop-
erability of currently closed-loop, pro-
prietary payment channels.
The diversity of those who make remote 
payments possible in the U.S. represents 
both a challenge and an opportunity. 
The challenge is to encourage highly 
diverse and competitive participants to 
cooperate on payments security. The 
opportunity is to utilize and integrate 
varying platforms and areas of expertise 
to achieve and maintain a more secure 
payment system that will operate efficiently 
over the long term. The Federal Reserve 
Bank of Chicago is committed to part-
nering with industry players to support 
such efforts.16  
10  See Thomas Claburn, 2009, “Heartland 
Payment Systems hit by data security breach,” 
InformationWeek, January 20, available at 
www.informationweek.com/news/security/
attacks/212901505.
11  EMV is a global standard for credit and 
debit payment cards based on chip card 
technology. It is important to note that 
Visa has issued incentives for merchants 
accepting its brands to become compliant 
with EMV standards and NFC (near field 
communication) standards (which enable 
contactless point-of-sale transactions using 
mobile devices) by 2015; wider merchant 
compliance could lead to much faster 
adoption of EMV and NFC technologies. 
12 The U.S. still tends to rely on magnetic 
stripe payment card technology.
13  Interchange fees are per debit or credit trans-
action fees paid by the acquiring bank to the 
issuing bank; these fees are typically passed 
on to the merchant by its bank (see note 1). 
14  One might contrast this system with the 
Canadian payment system, in which all 
debit card transactions are PIN based and 
operate on a network separate from credit 
card transactions.
15 See www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2011-07-20/ 
pdf/2011-16860.pdf. 
16  The SRPc is conducting a pilot study to dem-
onstrate the effectiveness of authentication 
techniques and to measure consumer 
behavior related to those techniques; see 
www.secureremotepaymentcouncil.org.